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The following article is based on 
"Deterrence and Distribution in the 
Law of Takings," 112 ffaward Law 
1 Review 997-1025 (March 1999), 
0 1999 by the Haward Law Review 
Association, and appears here by 
permission. A complete version, with 
citations, is available from the authors 
or the editor of Law Quadrangle Notes. 
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1; I The law of takings couples together matters that should be treated 
independently The conventional view, 
shared by courts and commentators alike, 
has been that any takings case can be 
resolved in one of two ways: either there is 
a talung and compensation is due, or there 
is no t a h g  and no compensation is due. 
These results are fine as long as one 
holding or the other serves the two central 
concerns of the Takings Clause - 
eficiency and justice. But a problem arises 
when the two purposes behind the law of 
takings come into cordhct, as they readily 
might. It happens that in some takmgs 
cases there are good reasons to require 
payment by the government, but not 
compensation to the aggneved property 
owners. In other cases, the opposite is true 
BY MICHAEL A. HELLER AND JAMES E. KRIER - compensation to individuals makes 
sense, but payment by the responsible 
government agency does not. What is 
needed, then, is a set of four possible 
resolutions, instead of the conventional 
two; the two new resolutions become 
available when we uncouple efficiency 
considerations from justice considerations, 
or, put another way, when we uncouple 
"tahng" on the one hand from 
"compensation" on the other. The resulting 
set of four possible resolutions helps 
smooth out some of the many wrinkles for 
which the law of tahngs is renowned. 
And new wrinkles keep turning up. In 
Plzillips v. Washii~gton Legal Foundatioiz, 
118 S. Ct. 1925 (19981, the Supreme 
Court considered the meaning of the 
phrase "private property" in the 
Constitution's injunction "[Nlor shall 
private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." The majority 
and dissenting opinions in Phillips took a 
range of interpretive approaches to the 
issue, each seemingly sensible but none 
fully faithful to the animating concerns of 
the just compensation requirement. The 
debate among the justices ends up 
shedding little light on the ultimate takings 
question in the case, which remains to be 
resolved on remand. As the latest in a 
string of unsatisfyng talungs decisions, 
Phillips proves less interesting for the 
answers it provides than for the questions 
it provokes, at least in our minds. Despite 
all their differences, the Court's nine 
members implicitly agreed on one thing - 
the possibility of a taking without 
compensation. This seemingly novel notion 
has moved us to thnk  anew about the 
conventional law of talungs, and to 
consider the virtues of an expanded 
approach. 
The purposes of the 
Takings Clause 
B. Distribution - specific and general 
The distributional function of just 
compensation is the one most readily 
Begin with the aims of the Takings acknowledged by the courLs. A familiar 
Clause. In a vast and otherwise contentious Statement of [he idea appears in Justice 
literature, whether judicial opinions or Black's opinion in Amzstl-ong v. United States 
scholarly books and articles, there appears (364 40 [19601): '[The Fifth 
to be virtual consensus that the purposes of Amendment's guarantee that private 
just compensation are essentially two. property shall not be taken for a public use 
Frank Michelman calls them and without just compensation was designed to 
"fairness" in an article that remains, more bar government from forcing some people 
than 30 years after its publication, the most to bear public burdens which, in all 
significant piece of academic commentary fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
on our subject ("Property, Utility, and public as a whole." As with deterrence, it 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical proves useful to think about distribution in 
Foundations of yust compensation1 L ~ ~ , ~  terms of the specific and the general. What 
80 Halval-d Law Revinv 1165 [1967]). we call spec$c distribution is simply the 
He could just as well have called them method of compensation that courts use in 
and ~~ust ice ,n  and, in fact, lIe takings cases now: they determine and 
later does. Efficiency argues for allocating distribute the amounts due in terms of 
resource among altematiw uses in ways each aggrieved claimant a an individual. 
that maximize value; justice argues for Genel-a1 distribution, on the other hand, 
distributing the costs and benefits resulting is Our own invention, different in method, 
from particular allocations in ways that and to some degree in purpose, from 
satisfy some equitable principle of conventional (specific) compensation. As 
rightness. we have already suggested, there are 
~ f f i ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~  in short, is about the size of occasions when the Takings Clause, rightly 
the pie, and justice is about who should considered, calls for payment of deterrence 
get what piece. We prefer to think about damages by the government, but not for 
these two concerns terms of deterrence specific distribution of compensation to 
and distribution, because doing so lets us claimants as individuals. Especially when a 
clarify some interrelationships that might government unduly burdens 
otherwise be overlooked. many parties, high transaction costs may 
make it infeasible to compensate each 
A. Deterrence - general and specific affected person through a 
posner identifies one deterrence distribution of individually tailored 
rationale for the government's obligation to p a y e n t s .  At the same time, might 
pay compensat~on, "The simplest economic not require a specific distribution either. 
explanation for the requirement of just But it hardly follows that the responsible 
compensation," he says, "is that it prevents government agency have pay, 
the government from ovemsing the taking because considerations of efficiency might 
power." If the government were free to take for p a y e n t  as a a spur 
resources without p a p g  for them, it appropriate incentives. When the 
would not feel incentives, created by the government is to Pay deterrence 
price system, to use those resources damages b u ~  not to make a specific 
efficiently A likely consequence would be we the payment a general 
the movement of some resources from distribution. For example, the responsible 
higher to lower valued uses. The aim to government bureau could be required to 
avoid this tendency we shall call general Pay deterrence damages a fund, 
deterrence. or even into general revenues. (For our 
Specijc deterrence has a related but approach to work in practice, fiscal 
nonetheless different purpose: the boundaries must not be too porous, or else 
obligation to pay compensation can damage payments could flow back to the 
constrain governmental inclinations to responsible government bureau and 
exploit politically vulnerable groups and undermine  he intended deterrent effect.) 
individuals. James Kent, in his Corn~nentaries 
(1827; reprinted by Da Capo Press, 1971), 
captured the essence of both hnds of 
deterrence when he referred long ago to 
the compensa~ion requirement as a "check" 
on government power. 
f compensation were not required, 
politicians would be inclined to support 
government projects that benefit the 
privileged at the expense of the 
vulnerable. If the latter lose more than 
the former gain, then this kind of 
singling-out promotes inefficiency and 
injustice alike. 
C. Interrelationships of deterrence 
and distribution 
Deterrence and distribution are not 
always independent of one another. Take 
the case of general deterrence. If 
compensation of any kind is denied when 
lustice would insist upon it, the result 
would not only be unfair but might be 
inefficient as well. First of all, to relieve the 
government of any obligation to pay is to 
forgo an opportunity to test whether the 
benefits of a government program are truly 
worth its costs, an important matter when 
the benefit-cost call is a close one. Second, 
a program that would be efficient if 
compensation were paid to burdened 
parties migh~ be inefficient if compensation 
is withheld, as a consequence of the 
demoralization suffered by the uncompen- 
sated losers. Demoralization has to figure 
into the calculation of final costs and 
benefits, and thus into the question 
whether a government program enhances 
or diminishes net welfare. Specific 
deterrence implicates similar efficiency 
concerns. If compensation were not 
required, politicians would be inclined to 
support gdvernment projects that benefit 
the privileged at the expense of the 
vulnerable. If the latter lose more than the 
former gain, then this kind of singling-out 
promotes inefficiency and injustice alike. 
Interrelationships like these have an 
important bearing on the choice between 
specific and general distributions, a point 
urulnary 
Taking 
FIGURE 1 : Uncoupling Deterrence and 
Distribution, Taking and Compensation 
for example) can advance general or 
specific deterrence, even through the 
amount paid is not specifically distributed 
to claimants. Beyond that, it is plausiblr, to 
suppose that general distributions can bk 
formulated in such a way as, to ease / 
demoralization (an efficienq concern) and 
promote a sense of fairness or justice, 
matters we save for further discussion in 
connection with the Phillips case. 
The idea behind Box 3 is more 
straightforward: there are occasions when 
justice calls for specific distributions to 
aggrieved parties, even though there is no 
taking (say because there is no reason to 
suppose that deterrence is a matter of 
concern). Notice that we have a source for 
such payments; among other possibilities, 
they could be drawn from the amounts 
paid in by a government agency as general 
distributions in Box 2 cases. 
Our claim emerges from the foregoing. 
A .  expanded conception of the takings 
picture - a move from two, al9rnative 
resolutions to four - can hdp resolve 
conflicts left unattended by current law 
r 
The Phillips case 
should there be payment 
by the government? 11 
Should there be 
specification distribution 
to claimants? I 
best explained by reference to Figure 1 
Now wemnt to go back to Phillips v. 
Washiington Legal Foundation, the case that 
provoked essay For generations, 
lawyers have pondered the question, 
"What is private property?" The same issue 
is obviously latent in every t a h g s  dispute, 
yet it is seldom aired because the 
"propertynessD of the asset at stake in the 
litigation is usually uncontested. In Phillips 
it was not. 
Briefly the story behind Phillips is this. 
Before 1980, the only checkmg accounts 
that federally insured banks could provide 
paid no interest. Lawyers used the accounts 
anyway for pooling and disbursing certain 
funds entrusted to them by or for clients, 
namely any funds too nominal in amount, 
or held for too short a term, to earn 
interest net of expenses in a savings 
account. (Savings accounts were usually 
used for large amounts held on behalf of 
individual clients.) Beginning in 1980, the 
rules were changed to permit federally 
insured interest-bearing checlung accounts 
for some kinds of deposits; lawyer trust 
funds could earn interest if charitable 
organizations received the interest. States 
moved quickly to capitalize on the new 
rules by enacting Interest on Lawyer Tmst 
Account (IOLTA) programs. The programs 
provide that any client funds otherwise 
incapable of earning interest (that is, 
(above), which uncouples matters that are 
conventionally bound together. 
Conventional wisdom allows for a pairing 
of no takingno compensation, the ordinary 
regulation that appears in Box 1, and for a 
pairing of takingcompensation, the 
ordinary taking that appears in Box 4. The 
familiar view overlooks an additional set of 
two, the pairing of takingno compensation 
that appears in Box 2 and the pairing of 
no takinglcompensation that appears in 
Box 3. 
In the Box 1 and Box 4 cases, efficiency 
and justice concerns can be harmonized by 
one or the other or- route. Box 1 
refers to cases where neither efficiency nor 
justice calls for payment by the 
government or to any individual; Box 4 has 
in mind cases where efficiency and justice 
both call for the opposite. 
Our new entries, Box 2 and Box 3, deal 
with purposes in conflict. When we speak 
in Box 2 of a taking without compensation, 
we mean a talung with no specific 
distribution, as opposed to a general one. A 
general btribution that forces the 
government to pay (into some special fund, 
nominal and short-term amounts) are to be 
pooled together in IOLTA accounts. The 
interest thereby earned by the aggregated 
funds is then distributed to nonprofit 
organizations that render legal services to 
the poor. Every state and the District of 
Columbia has such a program, and in more 
than half of them attorney participation is 
mandatory 
The plaintiffs in Phillips challenged 
Texas' mandatory IOLTA program on 
several constitutional grounds, but the only 
question that reached the Court, and the 
only one that shall concern us here, was 
whether the interest on IOLTA accounts is 
private property for purposes of the 
Takings Clause. The district court rejected 
the plaintiffs' claims on summary 
judgment. Because the funds deposited 
into IOLTA accounts are only those 
incapable of earning interest net of costs, 
the judge reasoned that clients owning the 
principal lost nothing; indeed, they never 
really had any property in the interest in 
the first place. Given that there was no 
property, there could be no taking. The 
same logc must have figured in the 
thinking of the hundreds of state judges 
who had previously considered the 
constitutionality of IOLTA programs in the 
course of adopting them, and it supported 
decisions by federal courts of appeals in 
two earlier cases. 
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit nevertheless disagreed, 
choosing to apply a different but no less 
rigorous logc. The principal amounts 
deposited into IOLTA accounts are 
obviously the property of the various 
clients who handed over the money Under 
Texas law, the court observed, the general 
mle is that "interest follows principal"; 
therefore, the interest must be the clients' 
property as well. The Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
affirmed, noting that it expressed no view 
as to whether the Texas IOLTA program 
worked a taking, or, if it did, whether any 
compensation was due. Those were 
questions to be decided on remand. Four 
justices dissented. 
Phillips in our model 
Phillips is a member of a class of cases 
concerned with government regulatory 
programs that impose trivial burdens per 
capita but, because a large number of 
people are alfected, may involve substantial 
sums in the aggregate. Our general reaction 
to such cases runs like this: the small 
burden per individual could support a 
conclusion that no specific distribution is 
required on fairness grounds or to ease any 
"demoralization" among risk-averse 
property owners. Moreover, given the large 
number of people affected, concerns about 
high settlement costs suggest that if any 
distribution at all is to be considered, it 
should be a general distribution. If 
deterrence concerns arise because of the 
large aggregate sums at stake, they could be 
addressed by making the responsible 
government bureau pay, as a general 
deterrent; the obligation to pay may also be 
a welcome specific deterrent in instances 
p i n g  rise to suspicions that politically 
vulnerable groups are being exploited. 
But Phillips calls for more particular 
analysis, in part because it involves a 
situation where the government program 
itself creates value by pooling property 
fragments, and in part because the value 
created arguably comes at no expense to 
property owners, meaning, among other 
things, that there is no case for general 
deterrence. 
Pooling programs are common, but 
their analysis has been neglected, especially 
in connection with takings. In this regard, 
notice that both specific and general 
distribution seem to be impossible in 
IOLTA cases, because there is nothing to 
distribute. The claimants suffered no loss 
by the conventional measure, and using an 
alternative measure - one that made the 
government pay back the interest earned 
by the pooled accounts - would amount 
to wiping out IOLTA programs altogether. 
Plzillips, then, is a pooling case, but of an 
unusual sort, and unusual cases might call 
for measures that rely on some mechanism 
other than payments of money by and to 
the parties in the lawsuit. 
In deciding whether IOLTA interest was 
property, the majority in Phillips focused on 
the gross interest corresponding to a single 
client's principal. In contrast, the dissenters 
argued that if any interest-related number 
were relevant, it would be the net interest 
available for distribution in the unpooled 
case, by definition a negative amount. 
Neither approach addresses the novel 
takings issues that pooling raises; the most 
salient numbers are those more or less 
ignored in Phillips. 
One of these is the net interest that a 
marginal client could deny to a mandatory 
IOLTA program if the client were allowed 
an "opt-out" option, say by directing that 
her principal not go into her lawyer's 
IOLTA account. Justice Breyer probably 
had this in mind when he said that the 
"most that Texas law here could have taken 
from the client is . . . the client's right to 
keep the client's principal sterile, a right to 
prevent the principal from being put to 
productive use by others." Notice, though, 
that Justice Breyer's observation is not quite 
correct. A marginal client's choice to opt 
out of an IOLTA would not render the 
client's principal "sterile"; the money would 
remain productive, but the resulting 
interest would be enjoyed by depository 
banks. Essentially, IOLTA programs 
redistribute wealth from organizations that 
provide banlung services for depositors to 
organizations that provide legal services for 
the poor. 
The other salient number ignored by 
the majority in Phillips is the cumulative 
net interest that IOLTA programs earn from 
pooling, a sum by definition not capable of 
specific distribution because such a 
distribution would make IOLTA pointless). 
While the majority deferred discussing it, 
Justices Souter and Breyer happily noted 
that conventional just compensation 
doctrine would assign this new value to the 
government because it was generated by 
the government program at issue. Our 
approach opens up new possibilities for 
distributing the cumulative gains from 
pooling in ways that would better serve the 
purposes of the Tahngs Clause. For 
example, certain forms of general 
distribution could gve clients just what 
mandatory IOLTA programs take away: the 
right to determine the uses to which the 
earnings from principal are put, or what we 
call "client-voice." Whereas conventional 
talungs law focuses on unpooled gross and 
net interest, an approach based on 
deterrence and distribution rightly shfts 





A better approach to P/lillips is to 
identify the deterrence and distribution 
issues at stake and to uncouple them in a 
way that makes matters more tractable. In 
this respect, however, the case is far from 
transparent to us. The path taken by all the 
justices resulted in, among other things, a 
conventional factual record that is 
inadequate for our unconventional 
purposes. On the deterrence side, we need 
to know if IOLTA programs are likely to be 
so inefficient or oppressive as to require 
some sort of check on the government; 
with respect to distribution, we need more 
nuanced information about the plaintiffs' 
fairness claims and options for redressing 
them. In the absence of a more developed 
record, we can only offer some initial 
speculations. 
Pooling programs can raise questions 
about inefficiency and general deterrence, 
but the particular kind of pooling involved 
in IOLTA programs seems untroubling. All 
IOLTA programs generate value, yet even 
the mandatory ones inflict no actual 
monetary harm on any individual. The 
degree of harm is clear, and clearly trivial, 
per capita and in the aggregate, making 
general deterrence a nonissue. So, too, for 
specific deterrence. Clients who deposit 
money in lawyers' trust fund accounts do 
not strike us as politically vulnerable. 
Though IOLTA programs may not be the 
least costly way to fund legal services for 
the poor, they are not egregiously 
inefficient and do not seem likely to have 
costly collateral consequences; for example, 
clients are unlikely to respond by 
underusing the legal system. 
Fairness concenls are more troubling in 
Phillips, partly because conventional just 
compensation doctrine responds so poorly 
to the expressive and liberty interests at 
stake in the case. In IOLTA programs, 
monetary losses are not the crux. Denial of 
client-voice is. In this light, the majority's 
position in the case seems more than a 
little odd. The Chief Justice's opinion 
separated interest from the principal to 
which it owed. The interest was a real 
thing that might quite literally have been 
taken (the takings issue, recall, was 
102 T H E  UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LA\V SCHOOL 
remanded); IOLTAs redistribution of the 
productive capacity of the principal, on the 
other hand, was regarded as "at most" a 
regulation of the "use of the property," the 
plain implication being that it would pass 
constitutional muster. Yet the interest so 
captivating to the majority is worth 
absolutely nothing, zero, to a client 
depositing principal. At the same time, the 
denial of aggrieved IOLTA conscripts' 
abihty to control the way in which their 
principal is used seems to have concerned 
the Court not at all. In short, the majority 
focused on a trivial injury, but ignored a 
substantial insult. 
If considerations of justice were thought 
to require it, a court (assuming it has the 
authority) could instruct the responsible 
government agency to make a general 
distribution that gives clients a voice in the 
use of IOLTA funds (say, by voting whether 
to support legal services for the richer 
instead of the poorer), or could allow 
clients or their lawyers to opt out of (or not 
opt into) the program. But IOLTA 
programs do not seem to be a more 
oppressive means of raising funds than a 
straight tax on clients or other consumers 
of legal services would be, so such a move 
strikes us as unnecessary We see the 
argumerits for calling Phillips a Box 2 case, 
but we conclude, tentatively, that it ends 
up fitting best in Box 1. Mandatory IOLTA 





Presumably, more than a few of our 
readers will accuse us of demolishing the 
Takings Clause and building something 
else in its place. We (and many accessories 
before the fact) are guilty of the second 
charge, but not the first. The Supreme 
Court started the process of demolition 
75 years ago. Before then, takings law was 
pretty simple and solid, if not particularly 
satisfying. When the government took title 
to property or actually occupied it, then 
just compensation was due; othercvise it 
waa not. Matters started to get complicated 
in 1922, when the Court decided 
Pel~r~sylvm~ia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
191. Suddenly, even the burdens worked 
by regulatory measures might amount to 
takings, unless the measures were intended 
to control nuisances. 
Developments since have only added to 
tlhe muddle, but we shall refrain from a 
blow-by-blow description because even an 
abbreviated account would bore 
aficionados, and only a lengthy one would 
satisfy anybody else. Let an inventory 
suffice: Supreme Court decisions over the 
last three-quarters of a century have 
obscured and bifurcated the nuisance 
exception to regulatory takings; have 
waffled on the question of conceptual 
severance; have distinguished 
inconsistently between permanent and 
temporary takings; have suggested that 
what is not just compensation actually is 
just compensation, if only regulators are 
crafty; have made little of large losses, 
unless they are entire, and much of small 
ones, even when they are zero; have 
become confused about what 
"private property" is for 
purposes of the Talungs 
Clause; have, in short, 
turned the words of the 
Takings Clause into a 
cryptogram that only the 
justices in a gven case are 
able to decipher (and seldom 
do all of them agree). 
So demolition has been 
the Court's doing, and the 
mess is hardly surprising: 
changng times, values, 
politics, and personalities 
result in new and different 
Kennedy to caution that the Court must 
be "careful not to lose sight of the 
importance of identifying the property 
allegedly taken, lest all governmental 
action be subjected to examination 
under the constitutional prohibition 
against taking without just 
compensation, with the attendant 
potential for money damages.'' 
views among the members of 
the Court, yet our constitutional tradition 
requires that the justices always moor their 
opinions to particular words. The tie has 
held, but only because the words have 
been stretched beyond recoption. To 
make sense of the Takings Clause, it is time 
to look behind its text to its purposes, and 
go anew from there. One such purpose is 
obviously fairness, but another is 
necessarily efficiency, thanks to 
Pe~zncyZvm~ia Coal. Whatever the Court's 
decision in that case left obscure, it made 
clear that regulations are often a substitute 
for eminent domain. There is abundant 
agreement that the power of eminent 
domain is justified and constrained for 
reasons that have to do, in part, with 
efficient use of society's resources. I t  would 
be strange to suppose that the same is not 
tnle of regulatory substitutes. 
A problem with this observation is that 
it calls up the ghost of substantive due 
process. If the courts are to review 
regulatory measures with efficiency in 
mind and the means for deterrence in 
hand, then arguably this is little different 
from empowering them to second-guess 
the legslature generally But the Court does 
that now, at least in the context of takings. 
In its first exaction case, Nollan Y Callfoinia 
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 841 
(1987). the majority established a practice 
of reviewing land-use regulations with 
unusually close attention to the connection 
between ends and means. Then, in its 
subsequent decision in Dolan v. City qf 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994), the 
Court insisted upon rough proportionality 
between the thing exacted and the 
development permitted in exchange. 
Dissenting in the latter case, Justice Stevens 
remarked on the majority's "application of 
what is essentially the doctrine of 
substantive due process." 
Seemingly, the Fifth Amendment's 
limitation to measures taking "private 
property" would constrain the judiciary's 
freedom to strike down regulatory 
programs, but that constraint has just 
recently been loosened considerably In its 
decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 
S .  Ct. 2131 (1998), the Court considered 
the constitutionality of legslation holding 
certain employers retroactively liable for 
employee retirement benefits. The plurality 
invalidated the measure as a tahng, even 
though it concerned no standard property 
interest. The move prompted Justice 
.Kennedy to caution that the Court must be 
"careful not to lose sight of the importance 
of identifying the property allegedly taken, 
lest all governmental action be subjected to 
examination under the constitutional 
prohibition against tahng without just 
compensation, with the attendant potential 
for money damages. " 
The question of appropriate limitations 
on the scope of judicial review is not our 
problem. Whatever the boundaries of the 
Tahngs Clause, we think there is much to 
be gained by analyzing takings in terms of 
the clause's underlying purposes, and by 
understanding that efficiency and justice 
are best served by uncoupling matters and 
methods of deterrence from matters and 
methods of distribution. Thus might we 
develop a body of law as supple as the 
challenges it confronts. 
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